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This paper undertakes a normative investigation of the quantitative properties of optimal
tax smoothing in a business cycle model with state contingent debt, capital-skill
complementarity and endogenous skill acquisition under technology and public expen-
diture shocks. We find that skilled and unskilled labour tax smoothing maintain
quantitatively under externalities and exogenous shocks in skill acquisition, as well as
when the relative skill supply is exogenously determined. We further find that the
government finds it optimal to reduce both the size of the wedge between the marginal
rates of substitution and transformation in skill attainment in the long-run and the
standard deviation of this wedge over the business cycle. This is achieved by subsidising
skill creation and taxing both types of labour income.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
The celebrated tax smoothing result of Barro (1979) in a partial equilibrium setting has led to a number of important
studies on optimal fiscal policy over the business cycle in representative agent general equilibrium models. For example,
Lucas and Stokey (1983) formalised labour tax smoothing within a complete markets neoclassical setup without capital
when the government had access to state-contingent debt. Chari et al. (1994) generalised this result in a model with capital
and labour taxation and showed that Ramsey policy dictated that the labour income tax fluctuated very little in response to
aggregate shocks and the ex ante capital income tax fluctuated around zero.
The literature has also examined the implications of policy frictions and incomplete asset markets for optimal tax and
debt policy through a variety of restrictions to the policy instrument set, government debt and capital income taxation (see
e.g. Stockman, 2001; Aiyagari et al., 2002; Angeletos, 2002; Bueraa and Nicolini, 2004; Farhi, 2010). In contrast, assuming
complete asset markets and a complete instrument set, Arseneau and Chugh (2012) considered labour market frictions
associated with a division of the labour force into employed and unemployed workers. Their model, with state-contingent
debt but no capital, suggested that optimal labour tax volatility depended on whether wages were set efficiently.er B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
ham.ac.uk (S. Asimakopoulos).
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particular, how these complement capital in the production process. This is especially pertinent given the empirical
relevance of the wage premium accruing to skilled labour and the roles attributed to capital-skill complementarity, the
relative supply of skilled labour and capital augmenting technical progress (see e.g. Katz and Murphy, 1992; Krusell et al.,
2000; Hornstein et al., 2005). In an important contribution, which also considers non-homogenous labour, Werning (2007)
established the conditions under which optimal labour tax smoothing held in a model with redistribution under complete
asset markets when workers differed with respect to their productivity. However, since the distribution of productivity
differentials is taken as given, this approach does not account for the endogenous determination of employment type (see
e.g. Matsuyama, 2006, who also reviews the literature on upward professional mobility).
In this paper we aim to contribute to the tax smoothing literature by focusing on the differences in the complementarity
between capital and skilled/unskilled labour as well as the endogenous determination of the relative skill supply for Ramsey
tax policy. Compared to Werning (2007), we focus on aggregate outcomes and abstract from redistribution incentives, by
following the literature that examines a division of the labour force into two types of workers. To this end, we work with a
representative household which guarantees its members’ the same level of consumption (see e.g. Arseneau and Chugh,
2012). We thus stay as close as possible to the representative agent Ramsey analysis of Chari et al. (1994) and extend their
model to allow for capital-skill complementarity and endogenous skill formation.
Our goal is thus to undertake a normative investigation of the quantitative properties of optimal taxation of capital and
labour income, as well as skill-acquisition expenditure, in the presence of aggregate shocks to total factor productivity (TFP),
investment-specific technological change and government spending. We assume complete asset markets, but consider the
implications of different assumptions regarding the mechanism driving skill acquisition which can lead to labour market
imperfections. Motivated by the analysis and discussions in Goldin and Katz (2008), we focus on three main alternative
cases. First, we evaluate the effects of externalities in skill creation given the relevance of peer effects related to
neighbourhood and social class. Second, we consider the importance of shocks to exogenous non-fiscal policy interventions
and socio-political factors affecting skill formation. Finally, we examine the implications of restricting the ratio of skilled to
total workers to remain constant.
In our setup, the government can borrow, tax (or subsidise) skill acquisition expenditure, capital, skilled and unskilled
labour income separately, to finance exogenous public spending. All policy instruments are allowed to be state-contingent.
In this environment, the optimal taxes on labour income and skill acquisition expenditure are uniquely determined.
However, as is well known, when the government has access to both state contingent debt and state contingent capital
taxation, the second-best Ramsey allocations do not uniquely pin down optimal debt and capital taxes (see Chari et al.,
1994). Hence, following the literature, we discuss the properties of the ex ante capital tax rate. Moreover, we also examine
the case where debt is restricted to be state uncontingent, which allows us to calculate the ex post capital tax or, if we also
allow for state-contingent taxation of income from bonds, the private assets tax.1
We first find that labour income taxes remain smooth under capital-skill complementarity and the different assumptions
on skill acquisition considered. The tax on skilled labour income is more volatile when relative skill supply is endogenous,
whereas the unskilled labour income tax becomes more volatile when relative skill supply is fixed. However, given the small
magnitudes of the standard deviations, these changes are not quantitatively significant for the volatility of labour taxes.
Although optimal labour taxes do not optimally change much over the business cycle, we further find that capital-skill
complementarity leads to different correlations of the taxes on skilled and unskilled labour income with the exogenous
productivity shocks. In particular, to smooth labour hours for both types of skill, the government has to make the policy
wedges in the skilled and unskilled labour markets move in the same direction as the shock for skilled labour. In contrast,
the wedge needs to move in the opposite direction after the very short-run for unskilled labour. The difference arises
because technology shocks increase the productivity of skilled labour more than that of unskilled, which creates an
incentive to substitute skilled labour hours for unskilled. In turn, this implies that the tax on skilled labour income is
positively correlated with exogenous technological shocks, while the tax on unskilled labour income is effectively
uncorrelated.
We next find that the skill-acquisition subsidy is the least smooth of the policy instruments that apply to static
margins of choice and that its correlation properties follow those of the tax on skilled labour income. This subsidy is
used to affect the wedge between the marginal rates of substitution and transformation in relative skill supply. The
government finds it optimal to reduce this wedge in the steady-state and also to reduce its standard deviation over the
business cycle.
Our results further show that the skill heterogeneity considered, irrespective of the assumptions regarding relative
skilled supply that we examine, does not affect the results obtained in the literature regarding the cyclical behaviour of asset
taxes. In particular, the ex ante tax rate on capital fluctuates around zero and the state contingent private assets and ex post
capital taxes are near zero and are the most volatile of the tax instruments. Finally, we find that irrespective of the model
variant examined, all of the policy instruments except for the ex post capital tax and the private assets tax inherit the
persistence properties of the shocks.1 As shown by Zhu (1992) and Chari et al. (1994), state-contingent capital income taxes allow the government to implement the complete asset
markets outcome, despite the lack of access to state-contingent debt.
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problem respectively. Section 4 describes the quantitative implementation and Section 5 analyses the results. Section 6
draws the conclusions.
2. Model
We develop a model that extends the complete markets neoclassical setup in Zhu (1992) and Chari et al. (1994) by
allowing for a division of the labour force into skilled and unskilled workers, an endogenous skill supply and externalities in
skill-acquisition on the household side, and capital-skill complementarity on the goods production side. This setup implies a
wage premium for skilled labour, the relative supply of which can be increased by a cost to the household in the form of
earmarked training expenditure.2 As in Chari et al. (1994) households save in the form of physical capital and state-
contingent government bonds.
The household is modelled as an infinitely-lived representative dynasty. The head of the household makes all choices on
behalf of its members by maximising the aggregate welfare of the family, ensuring that each household member
experiences the same level of consumption irrespective of individual labour market status. This is a commonly employed
assumption since Merz (1995), given that it allows for tractability when studying aggregate fluctuations under
heterogeneities in the labour market (see e.g. Arseneau and Chugh, 2012 for an example with optimal tax policy).
Firms use capital, skilled and unskilled labour to produce a homogeneous product. Following Katz and Murphy (1992),
Krusell et al. (2000) and Hornstein et al. (2005), skilled labour is assumed to be more complementary to capital than
unskilled labour. Hence, capital accumulation as well as technological developments and government policies that are
capital augmenting, tend to increase the skilled wage premium. In contrast, increases in the relative supply of skilled labour
act to reduce the skill premium. Finally, the government can borrow and tax capital, skilled and unskilled labour income
separately, to finance subsidies on skill-acquisition expenditure and exogenous public spending.
2.1. Notation
The notation employed throughout follows Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012). In particular, we assume that in every period
tZ0, there is a realization of shocks (stochastic events) stAS. Therefore, at each period t there is a history of events
st ¼ s0; s1; s2;…; st½  which is known. The unconditional probability of observing a specific history of events st is defined as
πt st
 
. For t4τ, the conditional probability of having st sequence of events given the realization of sτ is defined as: πt st ∣sτ
 
.
2.2. Households
A representative household is composed of two types of members who provide skilled and unskilled labour services.3
The utility function of the household is given by U ct st
 
; ln;st s
t
 
; ln;ut s
t
  
where Uð:Þ is increasing, strictly concave and three
times continuously differentiable with respect to its arguments; ct st
 
is average consumption of all household members at
time t given the history of events st;4ln;st s
t
 ¼ψ tðstÞlst st  and ln;ut st ¼ 1ψ tðstÞ lut st , denote, respectively, average
household leisure time from skilled and unskilled members; lst s
t
 
and lut s
t
 
are leisure time per skilled and unskilled
member respectively; and ψ tðstÞ is the share of skilled to total household members or the relative skill supply. The time
constraints facing each type of member are given by
hst s
t þ lst st ¼ 1 ð1Þ
hut s
t þ lut st ¼ 1 ð2Þ
where, hst s
t
 
and hut s
t
 
denote, respectively, skilled and unskilled labour hours per member. The household can determine
its relative skill supply by incurring an average (over all its members) skill-acquisition expenditure, et st
 
, according to the
following relation:
ψ tðstÞ ¼ q et st
 
; eet s
t ; ξ  ð3Þ
where qð:Þ is increasing, strictly concave and three times continuously differentiable with respect to et st
 
and eet s
t
 
; eet s
t
 
denotes aggregate, economy-wide skill-acquisition expenditure that the representative household takes as given; and
0oξr1 is a parameter that captures the extent of externalities in skill creation, with higher values of ξ denoting less
externalities. Externalities associated with skill acquisition expenditure capture for example peer effects related to
neighbourhood and social class. The case where all expenditure on skill-acquisition is internalised, i.e. when
et st
 ¼ eet st  can be obtained by setting ξ¼ 1.
2 This is consistent with the literature on upward professional mobility, where there is a cost associated with achieving a higher professional status
(see e.g. Matsuyama, 2006 for a review of several models).
3 Note that the unit mass of household members is equal to the sum of its skilled and unskilled members.
4 Since consumption is the same for all members of the household, average and per member consumption are equal.
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 
to obtain skill-acquisition expenditure as a function of relative skill supply, i.e.
et st
  gðÞ ¼ g ψ tðstÞ; eet st ; ξ , where ∂g ð Þ=∂ψ t st  gψ st 40, and ∂g ð Þ=∂eet st  gee st o0.5 We will denote the solution
for et st
 
in (3) in the case where eet s
t
 ¼ et st  by gðÞ ¼ g ψ tðstÞ . Finally note the function gðÞ has the property that
gðÞ ¼ g½ψ tðstÞ; eet st
  when ξ¼ 1.
The household can invest in capital and in state-contingent sequentially traded government bonds that mature fully
within a period. The evolution of capital is given by
ktþ1ðstÞ ¼ ð1δÞktðst1ÞþAn;kt ðstÞitðstÞ ð4Þ
where kt st1
 
is the per member stock of capital at time t given the history of events st1; itðstÞ is investment in capital at
time t given the history of events st; and 0oδo1 is the capital depreciation rate. The capital evolution equation allows for
an exogenous process, An;kt ðstÞ, capturing an investment-specific technological change, which has been shown to contribute
to output fluctuations (see e.g. Greenwood et al., 2000), as well as the changes in the skill premium (see e.g. Krusell et al.,
2000; Lindquist, 2004; Pourpourides, 2011). By using Eq. (4) and defining as Akt ðstÞ  1=An;kt ðstÞ, we get the household's
sequence of budget constraints:
ct st
 þAkt ðstÞktþ1 st þ ∑
st þ 1
pt stþ1∣s
t btþ1 stþ1∣st  þ 1τat st  gðÞ ¼ 1τst st  wst st ψ tðstÞhst st 
þ 1τut st
  
wut s
t  1ψ tðstÞ hut st þ 1δ Akt ðstÞ  kt st1 þ 1τkt st h irt st kt st1 þbt st ∣st1  8t ð5Þ
where pt stþ1∣st
 
is the pricing kernel for government bonds in terms of t goods and btþ1 stþ1∣st
 
is the state stþ1
contingent payout value of bonds bought per member at period t;6; τst s
t
 
, τut s
t
 
, τkt s
t
 
are the tax rates on skilled and
unskilled labour, capital income respectively; and τat s
t
 
is a subsidy on skill-acquisition expenditure; wst s
t
 
and wut s
t
 
are
the wage rates of skilled and unskilled labour respectively; and rt st
 
is the return to capital.
2.3. First order conditions for households
The objective of the representative household is to maximise:
∑
1
t ¼ 0
∑
st
βtπt st
 
u ct st
 
;hst s
t ;hut st ;ψ tðstÞ  ð6Þ
where 0oβo1 is the household's subjective discount factor, subject to the sequence of constraints in (5), by choosing
fctðstÞ;hst ðstÞ;hut ðstÞ;ψ tðstÞ; ktþ1ðstÞ8stg
1
t ¼ 0 and fbtþ1ðstþ1; stÞ; 8stg
1
t ¼ 0, given initial values for b0, k0. In each time period t and
given history st, fbtþ1ðstþ1; stÞg1t ¼ 0 is a vector of government bonds with one element of the vector for each possible
realisation of stþ1. In (6), uð:Þ is obtained by substituting the time accounting identities for ln;st st
 
and ln;ut s
t
 
and the time
constraints (1)– (2) into Uð:Þ. This maximisation problem yields six first-order conditions which are reported in Appendix A.
Combining the first-order conditions for consumption, skilled and unskilled labour supply gives the following atemporal
equilibrium conditions, which equate the marginal rates of substitution between consumption and each type of labour with
the average returns to skilled and unskilled labour net of taxes:
uhs ðs
tÞ
ucðstÞ
¼ψ t st
 
wst s
t  1τst ðstÞ  ð7Þ
uhu ðs
tÞ
ucðstÞ
¼ 1ψ tðstÞ
 
wut s
t  1τut ðstÞ  ð8Þ
Substituting the first-order condition for consumption into the first-order condition for ψ tðstÞ gives the following atemporal
condition for relative skill supply:
uψ ðs
tÞ
ucðstÞ
¼ hst st
 
1τst st
  
wst s
t hut st  1τut st  wut st  1τat st  gψ st  ð9Þ
Condition (9) states that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and the relative skill supply is equal to the
net marginal benefit of increasing the household's share of skilled workers. The latter includes the net increase in labour
income, given by the difference between the post-tax labour income from an additional skilled member,
hst s
t
 
1τst st
  
wst s
t
 
, and the post-tax labour income from one less unskilled member, hut s
t
 
1τut st
  wut st . From
this, the household needs to deduct the post-subsidy cost for an additional skilled member, 1τat st
  
gψ s
t
 
.
Substituting the first-order condition for consumption and its one-period lead into the first-order conditions for the two
assets gives the following intertemporal conditions equating the current cost of investing in bonds and capital to the future
state-contingent and expected benefits respectively:
ucðstÞpt stþ1∣st
 ¼ βπtþ1 stþ1∣st ucðstþ1Þ ð10Þ5 Note that we follow Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) in using the notation ∂X ð Þ=∂xt st
  Xx st  for function X and variable x in time t for history st.
6 Given the period t state st ∣st1 (or else the history st), the income side of the household budget includes revenue from bonds dated bt st ∣st1
 
.
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βucðstþ1Þ
ucðstÞAkt ðstÞ
Aktþ1 stþ1ð Þ 1δ
 þ 1τktþ1ðstþ1Þ 	rtþ1 stþ1 i
)
¼ 1
"(
ð11Þ
where πtþ1 stþ1
 
=πt st
 ¼ πtþ1 stþ1∣st ; Et is the expectation conditional on information at time t (i.e. history st),
Etxtþ1ðstþ1Þ ¼ ∑
st þ 1 ∣st
πtþ1 stþ1
 
=πt st
 
xtþ1ðstþ1Þ; and the summation over stþ1∣st denotes the sum over all possible histories
~stþ1 such that ~st ¼ st .
By combining the intertemporal conditions (10) and (11) we obtain
Akt ðstÞ ¼ ∑
st þ 1
pt stþ1∣s
t f 1τktþ1 stþ1 h irtþ1 stþ1 þ 1δ Aktþ1ðstþ1Þg ð12Þ
which ensures no-arbitrage between the investment opportunities in bonds and capital.
2.4. Firms
Firms rent capital as well as skilled and unskilled labour from households to maximize their profits using a production
technology, FðÞ, that exhibits constant returns to scale in its three inputs:
Πt ¼ F ðhs;ft ðstÞ;hu;ft ðstÞ; kft ðstÞ; st
h i
wst ðstÞhs;ft ðstÞwut ðstÞhu;ft ðstÞrtðstÞkft ðstÞ ð13Þ
where FðÞ incorporates a stochastic shock, st, and an f superscript denotes firm quantities. This yields the standard first-
order conditions:
wst ðstÞ ¼ Fhs;f ðstÞ ð14Þ
wut ðstÞ ¼ Fhu;f ðstÞ ð15Þ
rtðstÞ ¼ Fkf ðstÞ: ð16Þ
2.5. Government budget and equilibrium conditions
Given a history st, the government finances an exogenous stream of expenses, get ðstÞ, subsidies to skill-acquisition
expenditure, τt
a
, and its debt obligation. bt st ∣st1
 
, by taxing capital and labour income and by issuing state-contingent debt.
Hence, the within-period government budget constraint is given by
get ðstÞ ¼ τst ðstÞwst ðstÞψ tðstÞhst ðstÞþτut ðstÞwut ðstÞ 1ψ tðstÞ
  hut ðstÞþτkt ðstÞrtðstÞktðst1Þτat st gðÞ
þ ∑
st þ 1
pt stþ1∣s
t btþ1 stþ1∣st bt st ∣st1 : ð17Þ
The aggregate consistency condition and market clearing conditions for skilled labour, unskilled labour and capital are given
respectively by
FðÞ ¼ ctðstÞþget ðstÞþgðÞþAkt ðstÞ ktþ1ðstÞ 1δ
 
ktðst1Þ
  ð18Þ
ψ tðstÞhst st
 ¼ hs;ft ðstÞ ð19Þ
1ψ tðstÞ
 
hut s
t ¼ hu;ft ðstÞ ð20Þ
ktðst1Þ ¼ kft ðstÞ: ð21Þ
Note that in equilibrium at the aggregate level eet s
t
  et st . The equilibrium condition for eet st  can be obtained by
setting eet s
t
 ¼ et st  in (3) and re-arranging for et st , which is equivalent to
eet s
t  g ψ tðstÞ : ð22Þ
Hence, to obtain the equilibrium conditions for the decentralised economy given economic policy, we substitute eet s
t
 
using
(22) into the first-order conditions of the private economy. This implies that in (5) we replace gðÞ by gðÞ and (9) becomes
uψ ðs
tÞ
ucðstÞ
¼ hst st
 
1τst st
  
wst s
t hut st  1τut st  wut st  1τat st   ~gψ st  ð23Þ
where ~gψ st
 
is obtained by substituting (22) into gψ st
 
.77 Note that the aggregate conditions (17) and (18) have already been written in terms of g ðÞ.
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conditions (19)–(21) into (14)–(16) and (18). In particular, we substitute hs;ft ðstÞ, hu;ft ðstÞ, kft ðstÞ into FðÞ, Fhs;f ðstÞ, Fhu;f ðstÞ and
Fkf ðstÞ and denote the resulting quantities respectively by YðÞ, ~F hs st
 
; ~F hu s
t
 
; ~F k st
 
. Therefore, (14)–(16) and (18) become
wst ðstÞ ¼ ~Fhs st
  ð24Þ
wut ðstÞ ¼ ~Fhu st
  ð25Þ
rtðstÞ ¼ ~F k st
  ð26Þ
YðÞ ¼ ctðstÞþget ðstÞþgðÞþAkt ðstÞ ktþ1ðstÞ 1δ
 
ktðst1Þ
  ð27Þ
2.6. Model wedges
In Appendix B we present the social planner's solution for this model economy and express economic efficiency in terms
of marginal rates of substitution and marginal rates of transformation that explicitly treat skill acquisition as a primitive.
This further allows us, in Appendix C, to obtain the relevant wedges that prevent the private economy from achieving the
efficient outcomes, by comparing the first-order conditions that characterise equilibrium outcomes in the private economy
to the respective efficient conditions. This analysis demonstrates that, for the equilibrium margins characterising skilled and
unskilled labour supply and capital accumulation, the wedges are identical with the relevant labour and capital income
taxes. However, this is not the case for the choice of the relative skill supply. In this instance, the wedge, ψw, is composed of
market, ψm, and policy, ψp, components
ψw ¼ψmþψp ð28Þ
where
ψm ¼ ~gψ st
 gψ st  ð29Þ
ψp ¼ τst st
 
Fhs;f ðstÞh
s
t s
t τut st Fhu;f ðstÞhut st τat st  ~gψ st : ð30Þ
Hence, a sufficient condition for eliminating ψw is τst st
 ¼ τut st ¼ τat st ¼ 0 and ξ¼ 1. In particular, note that given the
Pigouvian nature of taxation in the model with externalities, if ξa1, setting the taxes to zero will not eliminate the wedge
between the market and efficient outcomes, since setting taxes to zero will eliminate ψp but not ψm. However, if ξa1, the
government can manipulate the taxes to affect the total wedge. Assuming that the government had access to a lump-sum
instrument to finance public spending, all wedges could be eliminated from the market economy by setting
τst s
t
 ¼ τut st ¼ τkt st ¼ 0 and
τat s
t ¼ gψ st
 þ ~gψ st 
~gψ stð Þ
: ð31Þ
The analysis in Appendix C also demonstrates that the tax systemwith which the government is endowed is complete, since
for each margin of adjustment in the market economy there is a unique policy wedge. In other words, the available policy
instruments determine each wedge uniquely.
3. The Ramsey problem
The government chooses labour and capital income taxes, the subsidy on skill-acquisition expenditure and next period
state-contingent debt to maximise the household's welfare subject to the equilibrium first-order conditions that summarise
the reactions of the private economy.8 Note that the Ramsey planner internalises the externalities associated with skill-
acquisition expenditure.
To solve the Ramsey problem we first derive the present discounted value (PDV) of the household's lifetime budget
constraint using the Arrow–Debreu price of the bond and the transversality conditions for bonds and capital. Second, we
derive the implementability constraint by substituting out prices and tax rates from the household's present value budget
constraint using the first-order conditions for the household and firm. Finally, we derive the optimal Ramsey allocations by
maximising the planner's objective function subject to the implementability constraint and the sequence of aggregate
resource constraints.8 In Angelopoulos et al. (2013), we develop a model where frictions in both labour and capital markets lead to income inequality between different
types of households. We then study the problem of a government which chooses taxes on total income for different households and non-contingent debt.
However, following most of the literature on optimal taxation, that setup does not allow for mobility between the different agents.
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We start with the household's flow budget constraint in equilibrium. Beginning from period 0 and by repeatedly substituting
forward one-period budget constraints for the household, we obtain the PDV of the household's lifetime budget constraint:
∑
1
t ¼ 0
∑
st
∏
t1
i ¼ 0
pi siþ1∣s
i
 	 !
ctðstÞ ¼ ∑
1
t ¼ 0
∑
st
∏
t1
i ¼ 0
pi siþ1∣s
i
 	 !
 f ð1τst st
  
wst s
t ψ tðstÞhst st þ ð1τut st  wut st 
 1ψ tðstÞ
 
hut s
t  1τat st  gðÞgþb0 þ ð1τk0 s0ð Þh ir0 s0ð Þþ 1δ Ak0ðs0Þn ok0 ð32Þ
where we have imposed the series of no-arbitrage conditions from (12) 8 t and the following transversality conditions for any s1:
lim
t-1
∏
t1
i ¼ 0
pi siþ1∣s
i
 	 !
ktþ1 st
 ¼ 0 ð33Þ
lim
t-1
∑
stþ 1
∏
t1
i ¼ 0
pi siþ1∣s
i
 	 !
pt stþ1∣s
t btþ1 stþ1jst ¼ 0 ð34Þ
which specify that for any possible future history the household does not hold positive or negative valued wealth at infinity.
Defining ∏t1i ¼ 0pi siþ1∣s
i
   q0t ðstÞ, 8tZ1, with q00ðs0Þ  1, where q0t ðstÞ is the Arrow–Debreu price, we can re-write (32) as
∑
1
t ¼ 0
∑
st
q0t ðstÞctðstÞ ¼ ∑
1
t ¼ 0
∑
st
q0t ðstÞ ð1τst st
  
wst s
t ψ tðstÞhst st þ ð1τut st  wut st  1ψ tðstÞ hut st  1τat st  gðÞ 
þb0þ ð1τk0 s0ð Þ
h i
r0 s0ð Þþ 1δ
 
Ak0ðs0Þ
n o
k0; ð35Þ
Note that the Arrow–Debreu price satisfies the recursion:
q0tþ1ðstþ1Þ ¼ pt stþ1∣st
 
q0t ðstÞ: ð36Þ
Using the first-order condition from the sequential equilibrium for pricing contingent claims (10) and noting that π0 s0
 ¼ 1, since,
at period 0 the state s0 is known, the above recursion can be written as
q0tþ1 s
tþ1 ¼ βtþ1πtþ1 stþ1 ucðstþ1Þucðs0Þ : ð37Þ
3.2. Implementability constraint
First, note that (37) implies
q0t s
t ¼ βtπt st ucðstÞucðs0Þ: ð38Þ
Substituting (38) for q0t ðstÞ; the first-order conditions of the firm, (24), (25) and (26) for wst st
 
, wut s
t
 
and r0, respectively;
and the first-order conditions of the household, (7), (8), (23) for τst s
t
 
, τut s
t
 
and τat s
t
 
respectively into the present value
budget constraint (35), we obtain the implementability constraint9:
∑
1
t ¼ 0
∑
st
βtπt st
 ½uc st ct st þuhs st hst st þuhu st hut st þuc st gðÞΩ st A¼ 0 ð39Þ
where A Aðc0 s0
 
;hs0 s
0
 
;hu0 s
0
 
;ψ0 s
0
 
; b0; k0; τk0Þ ¼ uc s0
 fb0þ½ð1τk0Þ ~F kðs0Þþ 1δ Ak0ðs0Þk0g and
Ω st
 ¼  uhs ðstÞ
ucðstÞψ tðstÞ
hst s
t þ uhu ðstÞ
ucðstÞð1ψ tðstÞÞ
hut s
t þuψ ðstÞ
ucðstÞ

 
= ~gψ s
t :
3.3. Pseudo value function
The government maximises (6) subject to the implementability constraint (39) and the sequence of aggregate resource
constraints in (27) 8t by choosing ct st
 
; hst s
t
 
; hut s
t
 
; ψ tðstÞ; ktþ1 st
 8st 1t ¼ 0, given b0; k0; τk0 .10 To achieve this, we
9 Note that the intertemporal first-order condition (12) has been used already in deriving (35), while the government budget constraint is redundant,
since it is a linear combination of the household's budget constraint and the aggregate resource constraint. Therefore, (27) and (39) summarise all the
constraints that the government needs to respect.
10 Note that following the literature we do not examine the problem of initial capital taxation and thus do not allow the government to choose τ0
k
.
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V ct st
 
;hst s
t ;hut st ;ψ tðstÞ;Φ ¼ u ct st ;1hst st ;1hut st ;ψ tðstÞ þΦ½uc st ct st 
þuhs st
 
hst s
t þuhu st hut st þuc st gðÞΩ st  ð40Þ
whereΦ is the Lagrange multiplier with respect to the implementability constraint.11 The Lagrangian of the Ramsey planner
is defined as
J ¼ ∑
1
t ¼ 0
∑
st
βtπt st
 fV ct st ;hst st ;hut st ;ψ tðstÞ;Φ þθt st ½YðÞct st get ðstÞgðÞðktþ1ðstÞþð1δÞktðst1ÞÞAkt ðstÞgΦA ð41Þ
where fθtðstÞ; 8stg1t ¼ 0 is a sequence of Lagrange multipliers attached to the aggregate resource constraint.
For a given level of b0; k0; τk0
 
, J is maximized with respect to fct st
 
;hst s
t
 
;hut s
t
 
;ψ tðstÞ; ktþ1 st
 
; 8stg1t ¼ 1 and c0 s0
 
,
hs0 s
0
 
, hu0 s
0
 
, ψ0ðs0Þ, k1 s0
 
yielding the following first-order conditions respectively:
Vc st
 ¼ θt st ; tZ1 ð42Þ
Vhs s
t ¼ θt st Yhs st ; tZ1 ð43Þ
Vhu s
t ¼ θt st Yhu st ; tZ1 ð44Þ
Vψ st
 ¼ θt st  gψ st Yψ st h i; tZ1 ð45Þ
θt st
 
Akt ðstÞ ¼ βEtθtþ1 stþ1
 
Yk s
tþ1 þ 1δ Aktþ1ðstþ1Þh i; tZ0 ð46Þ
Vc s0
 ¼ θ0 s0 þΦAc ð47Þ
Vhs s
0 ¼ θ0 s0 Yhs s0 þΦAhs ð48Þ
Vhu s
0 ¼ θ0 s0 Yhu s0 þΦAhu ð49Þ
Vψ st
 ¼ θ0 s0  gψ s0 Yψ s0 h iþΦAψ : ð50Þ
The first-order conditions derived in (42)–(50) imply that the system of equations to be solved will be different for t¼0
and for t40. These conditions in a non-stochastic environment are presented in Appendix D.
3.4. Capital and asset taxes
As is well known (see e.g. Zhu, 1992; Chari et al., 1994; Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012), the Ramsey problem with state-
contingent debt cannot uniquely pin down the capital tax rate. Hence, we follow the literature and calculate the optimal ex-
ante capital income tax rate (see Appendix E for details):
τk;atþ1 s
t ¼ βEtucðstþ1Þ ~F kðstþ1Þþ 1δ
 
Aktþ1ðstþ1Þ
h i
ucðstÞAkt ðstÞ
βEtucðstþ1Þ ~F kðstþ1Þ
: ð51Þ
Alternatively, by assuming that government debt is not state-contingent, we can calculate the ex post state contingent
capital tax (see Appendix F for the derivation):
τk;pt s
t ¼ 1
rtðstÞktðst1Þ
 
fget stð Þþτat st
 
g  tð Þð Þbtþ1 s
t
 
Rt stð Þ
þbt st1
 
τst ðstÞwst ðstÞψ t st
 
hst ðstÞτut ðstÞwut ðstÞ 1ψ t st
 Þ hut ðstÞg ð52Þ
where Rt stð Þ is the state uncontingent or the risk free return to holding government debt. Alternatively, assuming that the
government employs a state-contingent tax on income from government bonds, we can calculate the private assets tax,
ξ stþ1jst  that applies to taxing jointly the income from assets as (see Appendix F for the derivation):
ξt s
tþ1jst ¼ 1
Fkðstþ1Þktþ1ðstÞþbtþ1 stð Þ
 
 fgetþ1 stþ1ð Þþbtþ1 st
 btþ2 stþ1
 
Rtþ1 stþ1
 
τstþ1ðstþ1Þwstþ1ðstþ1Þψ tþ1 stþ1
 
hstþ1ðstþ1Þτutþ1ðstþ1Þwutþ1ðstþ1Þ
 1ψ tþ1 stþ1
  
hutþ1ðstþ1Þþτatþ1 stþ1
 
gððtþ1ÞÞg: ð53Þ11 Note that the multiplier Φ is non-negative and measures the disutility of future tax distortions.
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In this section we quantitatively solve both the non-stochastic and stochastic optimal policy models. Our solution
approach follows Arseneau and Chugh (2012). In particular, we first calibrate the non-stochastic model with exogenous
policy. Next, we solve the deterministic Ramsey problem, starting from the exogenous policy steady-state, using non-
linear methods. Since we are interested in tax smoothing over the business cycle, we then approximate around the
steady-state of the deterministic Ramsey problem to solve the stochastic problem and obtain near steady-state
dynamics.
4.1. Functional forms
Following Chari et al. (1994) and Stockman (2001), we use a CRRA utility function:
u ð Þ ¼
ct st
  1σ1σ2 ψ tðstÞlst st  σ1 1ψ tðstÞ lut st  σ2n oσ3
σ3
ð54Þ
where σ1 and σ2 are the weights to leisure in the utility function and σ3 is the relative risk aversion parameter.
The production side is given by a CES production function that allows for capital-skill complementarity, since the latter
has been shown to match the dynamics of the skill premium in the data (see e.g. Krusell et al., 2000; Lindquist, 2004;
Pourpourides, 2011):
FðÞ ¼ AtðstÞ μ hu;ft ðstÞ
 	α
þ 1μ  ρ kft ðstÞ 	νþ 1ρ  hs;ft ðstÞ 	νh iα=νg
1=α
(
ð55Þ
where AtðstÞ is total factor productivity; αo1, and νo1 are the parameters determining the factor elasticities, i.e. 1=ð1αÞ
is the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labour and between skilled and unskilled labour, whereas
1=ð1νÞ is the elasticity of substitution between equipment capital and skilled labour; and 0oμ;ρo1 are the factor share
parameters. In this specification, capital-skill complementarity is obtained if 1=ð1αÞ41=ð1νÞwhich also implies that the
skill premium is decreasing in ψ tðstÞ and increasing in ktðst1Þ.
The functional form for the relative skill supply is
q½ ¼Ψ et st
  γξ eet st  γð1ξÞ ð56Þ
where Ψ40 is the productivity of skill-acquisition; 0rγo1 measures the productivity of skill-acquisition expenditure;
and 0oξr1 is the parameter that captures the extent of externalities in creating skill.
4.2. Exogenous policy and calibration
We next present the calibration and steady-state for the exogenous policy model. In particular, we obtain the steady-
state of the decentralised competitive equilibrium (DCE). Given initial levels of k0, and b0, and the five policy
instruments fτst ; τut ; τkt τat ; get g, the non-stochastic DCE system is characterized by a sequence of allocations
fct ;hst ;hut ;ψ t ; ktþ1g
1
t ¼ 0, prices fwst ;wut ; rt ;Rtg1t ¼ 0, and the residual policy instrument fbtþ1g1t ¼ 0 such that (i) households
maximise their welfare and firms maximise their profits, taking policy, prices and aggregate outcomes as given; (ii) the
government budget constraint is satisfied in each time period and (iii) all markets clear. Thus, the non-stochastic DCE is
composed of the non-stochastic form of the first-order conditions of the household (7), (8), (10), (11) and (23), the
government budget constraint (17), the three first-order conditions of the firm (24)–(26), and the aggregate resource
constraint (27).
4.2.1. Calibration
The non-stochastic model with exogenous policy is calibrated so that its steady-state is consistent with the annual US data.
Utility: Table 1 below reports the model's quantitative parameters along with an indication of their source. Starting with
the share of leisure for each skill type in utility, σ1 and σ2, we calibrate these to 0.35 each so that, in the steady-state, the
household devotes about one third of its time to working. The relative risk aversion parameter, σ3 ¼ 2 is commonly
employed in business cycle models.
Production: The elasticities of substitution between skilled labour and capital and between unskilled labour and capital
(or skilled labour) have been estimated by Krusell et al. (2000). Following the literature (see e.g. Lindquist, 2004;
Pourpourides, 2011), we also use these estimates to set a¼0.401 and ν¼ 0:495. The remaining parameters in the
production function are calibrated to ensure the steady-state predictions of the model in asset and labour markets are
consistent with the data. More specifically, the labour weight in the composite input share μ¼ 0:268 is calibrated to
obtain a labour share of income of approximately equal to 69% and the capital weight in the composite input share,
ρ¼ 0:52, is calibrated to obtain a skill premium of 1.64. Both of these targets are consistent with the U.S. data for the
period 1970–2011. The target value for the skill premium is from U.S. Census data and the share of labour income in GDP is
Table 1
Model parameters.
Parameter Value Definition Source
0oσ1o1 0.350 Weight to skilled leisure in utility Calibration
0oσ2o1 0.350 Weight to unskilled leisure in utility Calibration
σ3o0 2.000 Coefficient of relative risk aversion Assumption
1
1α40
1.669 Cap. equip. to unskilled labour elasticity Assumption
0o 1
1νo
1
1α
0.669 Cap. equip. to skilled labour elasticity Assumption
0o1μo1 0.732 Share of composite input to output Calibration
0oρo1 0.520 Share of cap. equip. to composite input Calibration
A40 1.000 TFP Assumption
An;k40 1.000 Investment-specific productivity Assumption
0rδr1 0.007 Depreciation rate of capital Calibration
0oβo1 0.960 Time discount factor Calibration
0rγo1 0.172 Relative skill supply elasticity Calibration
0oξr1 0.700 The share of externality Calibration
Ψ40 1.000 Productivity of skill-acquisition Assumption
τk 0.310 Capital income tax rate Data
τu 0.200 Unskilled labour tax rate Data
τs 0.250 Skilled labour tax rate Data
τn 0.220 Effective labour tax rate Data
τa 0.000 Skill-acquisition expenditure tax rate Assumption
ge40 0.046 Government spending Calibration
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to unity (i.e. A¼ An;k ¼ 1).
Depreciation and time preference: The depreciation rate of capital δ¼ 0:07 is calibrated to obtain an annual capital to
output ratio of about 1.96, which is consistent with the annual data reported by the BEA on capital stocks.13 The time
discount factor, β¼ 0:96, is set to obtain a post-tax post-depreciation annual real rate of return on capital of roughly 4.17%,
which coheres with the 4.19% obtained in the data from the World Bank.14
Relative skill supply: We normalise skill-acquisition productivity, Ψ , to unity. To match the share of skilled workers in
total population, ψ, of roughly 44% in the data, we set the productivity of skill-acquisition expenditure, γ, equal to 0.172. This
share is consistent with the data from the 2010 U.S. Census which indicates that 43% of the population has a college
degree.15 It also corresponds with a related data set by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) which implies that the average share of
the labour force with a college degree is approximately 45%. We set ξ equal to 0.7, which produces a steady-state skill
expenditure to output ratio of about 4.3%, which is consistent with the data on tertiary education expenditure for the last
four decades from the U.S. National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics.16
Tax rates and government spending: Finally, we use the ECFIN effective capital and labour tax rates fromMartinez-Mongay
(2000) to obtain an average tax rate for capital and labour.17 Therefore, we set the tax rate for capital income τk ¼ 0:31 and
the two labour income tax rates τu ¼ 0:20 and τs ¼ 0:25.18 Given that it is difficult to obtain data which match well with the
skill-acquisition expenditure tax (subsidy) rate, τa, we set it to zero for the exogenous policy model. We finally set the
steady-state value ge ¼ 0:046, to obtain a steady-state debt-to-output ratio, b=Y ¼ 53%, which is equal to the average debt to
GDP ratio obtained in the data.19
Steady-state: The steady-state of the DCE defined and calibrated above is presented in Table 2. The results indicate that
the model's predictions for the great ratios match those implied by the data quite well. For example, in the data for 1970–
2011: k=y¼ 1:895, c=y¼ 0:640, i=y¼ 0:146, ge=y¼ 0:203 and b=y¼ 0:530.20 Moreover, the share of skill-acquisition
expenditure in GDP, e=y, coheres with US total expenditures for colleges and universities as a share of output of about12 The data source is the Current Population Survey, 2011 Annual Social and Economic Supplement from the U.S. Census Bureau.
13 Specifically, the BEA Table 1.1 on fixed-assets has been used to obtain the time series for capital stock for 1970–2011.
14 The data refers to the annual real interest rate from World Bank Indicators database for the period 1970–2011 (i.e. FR.INR.RINR).
15 This information is obtained from Table 4 of the Census Bureau, Survey of Income and Program Participation.
16 For instance, in the version of the model without the externality (ξ¼ 1) that will be discussed below, skill expenditure is about 5.3% of output.
17 In particular, we use the LITR and KITN rates for effective average labour and capital taxes respectively for 1970–2011, as they treat self-employed
income as capital income in the calculations.
18 Note that the calculation of the effective labour income tax rate is equal to 0.22. But since we assume that the skilled and unskilled labour income is
taxed differently we decompose the labour income tax into skilled and unskilled tax so as the weighted average of the two tax rates equals 0.22.
19 The source of that time series is: FRED Economic Data on Gross Federal Debt as a percentage of GDP, 1970–2011.
20 Note that if model prediction for the cost of becoming skilled, e=y¼ 0:0433, is added to the c=y ratio from the model, the sum is very close to the c=y
ratio in the data.
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been calibrated to match their values in the data.4.3. Deterministic Ramsey
The deterministic version of the Ramsey problem in (42)–(50) is summarised in Appendix D, (see Eqs. (D.1)–(D.16)) and is
solved iteratively, conditional on the calibration described in the previous section. In particular, we first guess a value for Φ
and solve Eqs. (D.1)–(D.15) for an allocation fct ;hst ;hut ;ψ t ; ktþ1g
T
t ¼ 0. Then we test whether Eq. (D.16) is binding and increase
or decrease the value of Φ if the budget is in deficit or surplus respectively.
The initial conditions for the model's state variables are given by the non-stochastic exogenous steady-state (see Table 2).
For the terminal values of the forward looking variables, we assume that after T years the dynamic system has converged to
its Ramsey steady-state. This implies that the appropriate terminal conditions are obtained by setting the values for these
variables equal to those of the preceding period.
The final system is given by ½ð5 TÞþ1 equations, which is solved non-linearly using standard numeric methods (see,
e.g. Adjemian et al., 2011). This gives the dynamic transition path from the exogenous to the optimal steady-state. We set
T¼250 to ensure that convergence is achieved. Our results show that this occurs for all endogenous variables within 150
years.22 After we find the optimal allocation for fct ;hst ;hut ;ψ t ; ktþ1g
T
t ¼ 0 we obtain w
s
t ¼ ~Fhs ðtÞ, wut ¼ ~Fhu ðtÞ and rt ¼ ~F kðtÞ.
Additionally, we solve for τt
s
, τt
u
, τt
k
and τt
a
using the non-stochastic form of (7), (8), (11) and (23) respectively.
The Ramsey steady-state is reported in Table 3. The results are consistent with the messages from the literature initiated
by Chamley (1986) on dynamic Ramsey taxation in a deterministic environment (see e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2012, ch.
16 for a review of this literature). As expected, allowing the government a complete instrument set results in a zero capital
tax rate in the long-run.
Compared with the steady-state of exogenous policy, a Ramsey government would increase capital accumulation in the
steady-state, by eliminating the intertemporal wedge. Moreover, given the externalities in skill creation, the government
finds it optimal to subsidise expenditure on skill-acquisition by about 40% in this setup, which leads to an increase in the
relative skill supply. Since this increase is encouraged by the skill subsidy, which stimulates overall effective skilled labour
hours, the government can tax at a slightly higher rate the higher labour income source, i.e. skilled labour income, which
allows for more tax revenue to be generated. Notice that the progressivity of optimal labour income taxation is very small
quantitatively. The fall in the skill premium under Ramsey policy suggests that the increase in the relative skill supply has a
relatively stronger quantitative impact than the increase in the capital stock. Finally, the government is able to finance part
of the required public spending in the long-run from accumulated assets.
We next study the transition dynamics associated with Ramsey policy. Fig. 1 illustrates the dynamic paths implied by
optimal policy for the capital tax, the two labour taxes, the skill-acquisition expenditure tax and debt to output as the
economy evolves from the exogenous steady-state to the Ramsey steady-state.
The first panel of Fig. 1 shows that in period 1 skilled and unskilled labour are subsidised at rates of 24.1% and 21.3%
respectively; and skill-acquisition expenditure is taxed at a rate of 3.6%. In period 2, skilled and unskilled labour taxes are
29.2% and 27.5% respectively and eventually converge to their steady-state values reported in Table 3. Also in period 2, skill-
acquisition is subsidised at a rate of 37.7% and converges to about 40% in the steady-state.
The second panel of Fig. 1 shows that in period 1, since capital is already in place, capital income is taxed at a confiscatory
rate (approximately 306%). In period 2, the capital income tax is 0.9% and then converges slowly to zero. The high capital
taxation in the first period allows the government to create a stock of assets by lending to the household. Government assets
increase in future periods and their income is used to subsidise skill-acquisition expenditure and to compensate for the
losses from foregone capital income taxation, without the need to resort to high labour income taxes. These transition paths
are consistent with previous research.4.4. Stochastic processes
To move to the analysis of the stochastic Ramsey problem, we need to define the stochastic processes that drive
economic fluctuations. In what follows we designate a stochastic state st at time t that determines exogenous shocks to total
factor productivity, At stð Þ, investment-specific technological progress, An;kt stð Þ, and government expenditures, get stð Þ.
Following the literature, At stð Þ, An;kt stð Þ and get stð Þ are assumed to follow stochastic ARð1Þ processes:
log Atþ1 stþ1ð Þ ¼ 1ρA
 
log AþρA log At stð ÞþεAtþ1 ð57Þ
log An;ktþ1 stþ1ð Þ ¼ 1ρAk
 
log An;kþρAn;k log A
n;k
t stð ÞþεA
n;k
tþ1 ð58Þ21 Tertiary education expenditure in the USA was higher in the early 1970s, but declined continuously since 1970 to converge to less than 4% over the
last two decades.
22 See Fig. 1 below for an illustration of convergence using the policy instruments.
Table 2
Steady-state of exogenous policy.
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0.5823 1.9629 0.1374 0.0433 0.5300 0.2371 1.6400 0.0417 0.4400
Table 3
Steady-state of optimal policy.
c
y
k
y
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y
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y
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y
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0.5565 2.6859 0.0605 0.8348 0.1950 1.4285
τs τu τk τa rnet ψ
0.2654 0.2577 0.0000 0.4005 0.0417 0.4819
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Fig. 1. Transition path of the policy instruments.
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 	
log geþρge log get stð Þþεg
e
tþ1 ð59Þ
where εt
A
, εA
n;k
t and ε
ge
t are independently and identically distributed Gaussian random variables with zero means and
standard deviations given respectively by σA, σAn;k and σge .
The values for the ARð1Þ coefficient and the standard deviation for the government expenditures are data-based and are
estimated to be: ρge ¼ 0:65 and σg ¼ 0:017.23 The AR(1) coefficient and the standard deviation for the investment specific
technological progress are calibrated to ρAn;k ¼ 0:70, σAn;k ¼ 0:012 so that the correlation of investment with output and the
relative standard deviation of investment to output are approximately equal to 0.85 and 4.3 respectively.24 The
autocorrelation parameter of TFP is set equal to 0.80 following Chari et al. (1994) and Stockman (2001), while σA is
calibrated to match the volatility of output observed in the BEA data.25 More specifically, the standard deviation for TFP is
set σA ¼ 0:8% to obtain a volatility for output from 1970 to 2011 of about 1%.23 The government spending series refers to government consumption expenditures and gross investment from NIPA Table 1.1.5 (1970–2011). To
calculate the statistical properties of the cyclical component of the series, we take logs and apply the HP-filter with smoothing parameter equal to 100.
24 The investment series refers to Private Fixed Investment and it is obtained from NIPA Table 5.3.5 (1970–2011). Cyclical investment is calculated using
the HP-filter as above.
25 The time series for GDP from 1970 to 2011 is obtained from NIPA Table 1.1.5. Cyclical output is calculated using the HP-filter as above.
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We next approximate the dynamic equilibrium paths due to three exogenous shocks using a first-order approximation of
the decision rules of the equilibrium conditions under optimal policy in (42)–(46), around the optimal deterministic steady-
state of these conditions described above.26 As is common in the literature when characterizing policy dynamics, we also
make the auxiliary assumption that the initial state of the economy at t¼0 is the steady-state under optimal policy. To
calculate the business cycle statistics of the relevant quantities of the model under optimal policy, we conduct simulations
by shocking all of the exogenous processes, obtain the required moments for each simulation and then calculate their mean
value across the simulations. We undertake 1000 simulations, each 400 periods long, to ensure that we have enough periods
to approximate lifetime quantities and that the model generated data is stationary.
5. Cyclical properties
We next present the results regarding the key second moments of the stochastic optimal policy problem. We conduct
this analysis for the benchmark model developed above and we also examine the robustness of the main results to changes
in the skill creation technology.
5.1. Capital and labour taxes
We start with the cyclical properties of Ramsey taxation in the benchmark model. Table 5 presents results on the means,
standard deviations relative to output and correlations for the optimal allocations, policy and wedges. The results regarding
optimal capital and labour taxes are largely consistent with the literature and thus extend previous findings to a setup with
capital-skill complementarity and endogenous skill supply. In particular, the ex ante tax rate on capital is effectively zero and
has the highest volatility of all tax instruments when debt is state-contingent. Moreover, when debt is not state-contingent,
the state contingent private assets and ex post capital taxes are near zero, have low correlations with output and are the
most volatile of the tax instruments.
Also consistent with the labour tax-smoothing literature, both labour taxes have very low standard deviations relative to
output, as the government finds it optimal to minimise the distortions introduced by labour taxes by keeping them
relatively smooth over the business cycle and by letting the remaining state-contingent policy instruments respond to
exogenous shocks. This finding also coheres with the results regarding the volatility of labour taxes in Werning (2007),
albeit in a different setup, since we allow for worker, as opposed to household, heterogeneity.27
Despite the similarity regarding their standard deviations, the labour income taxes exhibit different correlations with
output in our setup. In particular, the tax rate on skilled labour income is strongly pro-cyclical, whereas the tax rate on
unskilled labour income has a low and negative correlation with output. This difference maintains for both type of
technology shocks, since the correlations of τs with A and An;k are positive and high, whereas the correlations of τu with A
and An;k are close to zero. Note that the differences in the correlations of the two labour income taxes with the technology
shocks are mirrored in the differences in the correlations of skilled and unskilled labour hours with the technology shocks.
In particular, skilled labour hours are strongly correlated with both technology shocks, where unskilled labour hours exhibit
very low correlations.28 Finally, the correlations for all tax instruments with ge are very low, as the government uses state-
contingent government assets to accommodate temporary pure public finance shocks.
5.2. Skill-acquisition subsidy
We next find that the skill-acquisition subsidy is about four times more volatile than the remaining taxes that affect
static margins (i.e. τs and τu), but not as volatile as the tax instruments that affect the intertemporal margins of adjustment
(i.e. the capital and assets taxes). Quantitatively, its standard deviation implies very little fluctuations in τa over the business
cycle, as, 95% of the time it varies between 39.8% and 40.3%, given that σY ¼ 0:0047. Moreover, we find that τa is pro-cyclical
and is positively correlated with both technology processes.29
It should be noted here that the volatility of τa is due to the existence of the policy distortions in the labour markets and
therefore is a characteristic of the second-best nature of Ramsey optimal policy. Recall from the analysis in Section 2.6 that if
the government could finance public spending with lump sum instrument, so that τst s
t
 ¼ τut st ¼ τkt st ¼ 0, the optimal
skill-acquisition subsidy which would eliminate the wedge introduced by the externality in skill creation, τat s
t
 
, is given by
(31).26 We use the perturbation methods in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) to solve the dynamic model.
27 Werning (2007) shows that the optimal volatility of labour taxes for households of different ability is zero when the utility function incorporates a
constant Frisch-labour supply elasticity. In our model, it can also be shown that the standard deviations of the labour taxes are optimally zero for the
constant Frisch-labour supply elasticity case.
28 The dynamic behaviour of the tax rates and their relationships with the remaining endogenous variables are further discussed below when we
present responses to temporary shocks.
29 The responses of τa to exogenous technology shocks will be discussed in more detail below in the impulse response analysis.
Table 4
Parameters for stochastic processes.
Parameter Value Definition
σA 0.008 Std. dev. of TFP
ρA 0.800 AR (1) coef. of TFP
σAn;k 0.012 Std. dev. of capital equipment
ρAn;k 0.700 AR(1) coef. of capital
equipment
σge 0.017 Std. dev. of public spending
ρge 0.650 AR (1) coef. of public spending
Table 5
Stochastic results base model.
xi xi σxi
σY
ρ xi ; yð Þ ρ xi;Að Þ ρ xi;An;k
 	
ρ xi; geð Þ
Allocations
c 0.1315 0.5386 0.8655 0.7787 0.0656 0.0993
k 0.6347 3.4917 0.6404 0.3900 0.2194 0.0495
hs 0.3700 0.3963 0.7114 0.6038 0.7424 0.2452
hu 0.1715 0.4608 0.0689 0.0616 0.3771 0.2313
ψ 0.4819 0.2796 0.9252 0.7808 0.1826 0.0220
ws 0.6878 2.6241 0.9283 0.8346 0.0444 0.0571
wu 0.4815 2.0725 0.9275 0.8471 0.0131 0.0640
ws
wu
1.4285 0.7358 0.8752 0.8978 0.2194 0.1126
Policy and wedges
τs 0.2654 0.0776 0.7996 0.6379 0.7352 0.2121
τu 0.2577 0.0595 0.2005 0.0088 0.1834 0.1817
τk;a 6.07e5 2.7963 0.9370 1.0000 0.0037 0.0020
τk;p 0.0047 26.2437 0.3532 0.4371 0.0859 0.0983
ξ 7.51e4 13.7352 0.3526 0.4349 0.0835 0.0984
τa 0.4005 0.3144 0.8791 0.6621 0.5663 0.1092
ψw 0.0215 0.3125 0.9242 0.7629 0.2442 0.0036
ψm 0.0740 0.2069 0.9252 0.7808 0.1826 0.0220
ψp 0.0525 0.1070 0.9101 0.7185 0.3604 0.0321
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to the size of the externality, i.e. τat s
t
 ¼ 1ξ.30 Therefore, since we do not have a lump sum tax instrument in the model,
the volatility in the optimal τa reported in Table 5 is due to the presence of non-zero labour income taxes.
5.3. Skill acquisition wedge
Our results so far suggest that when the baseline neoclassical model is extended to allow for capital-skill complemen-
tarity and endogenous skill supply, the government still finds it optimal to keep the labour market wedges smooth, while
the capital tax wedge is effectively eliminated. However, the correlation of the labour wedges with the exogenous
technology processes differs for skilled and unskilled labour.
As Eq. (28) makes clear, the wedge in relative skill supply, ψw, depends on the subsidy to skill acquisition as well as on the
labour taxes which define ψp. Moreover, because of the externality in skill creation, ψw also depends on ψm. To further
investigate optimal policy in relation to the wedge in relative skill supply, we present in Table 6 the means and standard
deviations of ψw and its components for the model with exogenous policy and under the Ramsey planner.
The results in Table 6 show that optimal policy reduces the total wedge in the steady state, by turning the policy
component into a subsidy, and also reduces the standard deviation of the total component, by setting the policy instruments
over the business cycle to smooth the policy component of the wedge.
5.4. Impulse responses
To further analyse the effects of optimal policy over the business cycle and examine the optimal response of taxation to
changes in exogenous productivity, we plot the impulse responses of key endogenous variables, as percent deviations from30 Note that (56) implies that gψ st
 ¼ 1=γΨ psit st  ð1=γÞ1 and ~gψ st ¼ ð1=γξÞΨ ψ t st  ð1=γÞ1.
Table 6
Skill acquisition wedge.
Means Standard deviations (%)
Exog. policy Ramsey Exog. policy Ramsey
ψw 0.0842 0.0215 0.17 0.15
ψm 0.0477 0.0740 0.08 0.10
ψp 0.0365 0.0525 0.10 0.05
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Fig. 2. Impulse responses to 1% temporary productivity shocks.
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A
, εA
n;k
t . These plots are shown in
Fig. 2 above.31 To contextualise these effects we also plot the same impulse responses for the model with exogenous policy
discussed in Section 4. The continuous lines show the responses under Ramsey policy, while the dashed lines the responses
under exogenous policy.
The first point to note in Fig. 2 is that the government optimally smooths the reactions of the inputs in the production
process, in response to exogenous technology shocks, relative to the case with exogenous policy. To achieve this increased
smoothness in the labour markets, the government needs to make the wedges, which affect the household choices for hs, hu
and ψ, move in the same direction as these quantities.
In addition to the direct impact of the investment-specific shock, both technology shocks increase the productivity of
skilled labour relative to that of unskilled indirectly, via the increase in the capital stock. These productivity effects create
more incentives for the household to increase the relative quantity of skilled members. These effects also increase the labour
hours of the more productive type of labour and decrease the work time of the least productive (after an initial increase),
since both types of workers provide equally valued leisure time.
To mediate the above reactions, the government needs to increase the wedges in skilled labour hours, τs, and relative
skill supply, ψw, while concurrently decreasing the wedge in unskilled labour hours, τu. Note that despite the increase in τa,
the relative skill supply wedge has increased because ψw also depends on τs and τu positively and negatively, respectively, so
the changes in the labour taxes tend to raise ψw. These movements give rise to the correlations for taxes and wedges
summarised in Table 5.31 To save on space, we do not present the impulse responses to εg
e
t , since the tax instruments respond very little quantitatively to these shocks, as the
government uses state-contingent government assets to accommodate temporary pure public finance shocks.
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The results in Table 7 suggest that the labour income taxes and the ex ante capital income tax in this model inherit the
properties of the exogenous processes. For example, the autocorrelations of these instruments follow the autocorrelations of
the exogenous processes. Thus, when the shocks are autocorrelated as in Table 4, so are the tax rates. However, if we assume
that the shocks follow iid processes, the autocorrelation of the tax rates generally becomes very small.
In contrast, the autocorrelations of the ex post capital tax and the private assets tax do not follow the autocorrelations of
the exogenous processes. This is again similar to previous findings in the literature. The results in Table 7 finally show that
the skill-acquisition subsidy also inherits the properties of the exogenous processes, thus working in a similar fashion to the
remaining taxes that affect the static margins.
5.6. Alternative assumptions regarding skill supply
To further evaluate the importance of skill creation and endogenous relative skill supply for optimal taxation in the
benchmark model analysed above, we obtain the means and the standard deviations relative to output for taxes and wedges
for three alternative assumptions regarding relative skill supply. These are presented in Table 8.32
5.6.1. No externalities
The first case considered is a model without externalities in skill creation, obtained by setting ξ¼ 1 in qðÞ. In this case,
ψw ¼ψp, which implies that the skill-acquisition subsidy reflects only policy distortions and should be kept to a minimal
level at the steady-state. Moreover, labour income taxation becomes mildly regressive in the steady-state. Despite these
long-run adjustments, the relative standard deviations of taxes and subsidies do not change significantly, whereas the
wedge in relative skill supply has lower volatility, since this is only driven by the volatility of the policy component of
the wedge.
5.6.2. Productivity shock in skill creation
We next consider a case where the skill creation technology includes a productivity series, intended to capture
exogenous factors that affect skill creation and social mobility. For instance, it is generally accepted (see e.g. Goldin and Katz,
2008) that social mobility and enrolment in tertiary education, which in turn determine relative skill supply, can depend on
policy interventions. These may be the provision of access to skill-related education to members of deprived communities
and structural changes in the provision of primary and secondary education (e.g. the curriculum of studies and the
definition of school catchment areas).
To broadly capture these potential interventions, we allow for Ψt to be determined by an exogenous AR(1) process:
log Ψ tþ1 stþ1ð Þ ¼ 1ρΨ
 
log Ψ þρΨ log Ψ t stð ÞþεΨtþ1 ð60Þ
where εΨt is an independently and identically distributed Gaussian random variable with zero mean and a standard
deviation given by σΨ . We set ρΨ ¼ 0:95 and σΨ ¼ 0:009, so that the model generated series for relative skill supply is
consistent with the persistence and standard deviation (relative to output) of the data, for the model with exogenous policy
calibrated as in Section 4. We use annual data for the share of college educated to total working population measured in
efficiency units from the 1970s from Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and GDP data from the US NIPA accounts to find that the
autocorrelation of the cyclical component of relative skill supply is 0.47 and its standard deviation relative to output is 0.27.
The results in Table 8 suggest that optimal labour tax smoothing is not affected in this case and there is only a small
increase in the volatility of the skill-acquisition subsidy. The standard deviations of the wedge in relative skill supply and of
both of its components have increased significantly. However, given that the increased volatility in skill creation affects
efficient as well as market outcomes, the government does not find it optimal to change the cyclical properties of the tax
instruments significantly.
5.6.3. Fixed relative skill supply
The final case we consider is when the relative skill supply is fixed, ψ t s
t
 ¼ψ f ¼ 0:44 and thus exogenous to the
household. This assumption implies that skill creation expenditure also remains fixed at the level that is required to support
ψ t s
t
 ¼ 0:44. However, since there is no margin of adjustment for the household regarding the choice of ψt in this case, we
also normalise τat s
t
 ¼ 0, since it does not have a role to play in affecting a wedge in the model.33 In particular, assuming
that this restriction is imposed on the market economy, whilst the primitives of the model allow the social planner to
choose relative skill supply, we can define the wedge in relative skill supply as the difference between the efficient and the32 In all cases considered below, we do not re-calibrate the model, except for the specific changes we discuss in the specification for ψ t ðst Þ in (3), to
isolate the effects of the changes in skill supply. In each case, we re-calculate the deterministic Ramsey steady-state and obtain the required moments as
the economy fluctuates around this steady-state. We do not present results for correlations and autocorrelations as these are similar with those obtained
under the benchmark model.
33 Note that if τat s
t
 
was left as explicit choice of the government, it would be equivalent to a lump-sum tax, which would violate the second-best
nature of the problem that we want to study.
Table 7
Autocorrelations.
Autocorrelated shocks iid shocks
τs 0.7512 0.0121
τu 0.8593 0.0952
τk;a 0.7897 0.0023
τk;p 0.0362 0.4203
ξ 0.0328 0.4141
τa 0.8945 0.2041
Table 8
Stochastic results alternative specifications of q.
xi ξ¼ 1 AR process Ψ ψ t ¼ 0:44
xi σxi
σY
xi σxi
σY
xi σxi
σY
τs 0.2415 0.0766 0.2654 0.0794 0.2574 0.0755
τu 0.2512 0.0570 0.2577 0.0605 0.2160 0.1136
τk;a 6.07e5 2.7655 9.81e5 2.7168 3.15e4 5.3464
τk;p 0.0047 25.9045 0.0080 24.6766 0.0049 29.9299
ξ 4.91e4 21.6957 0.0015 12.4066 5.03e4 17.9873
τa 0.0745 0.3621 0.4005 0.3995 – –
ψwðψw;f Þ† 0.0288 0.1372 0.0215 2.5353 0.1439 1.4270
ψm – – 0.0740 1.1939 – –
ψp 0.0288 0.1372 0.0525 1.3443 – –
† ψw;f defined in Eq. (61) refers to the results in the last two columns.
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t
 
. This wedge in relative skill supply can be obtained by first combining (B.10) with (C.4) in
Appendix C, to write the efficient condition in terms of ψ tðstÞ and then comparing with the market condition ψ t st
 ¼ 0:44
to define the wedge as
ψw;f ¼ uψ ðs
tÞ
ucðstÞ
þhst st
 
Fhs;f s
t hut st Fhu;f st gψ st þψ t st ψ f : ð61Þ
As can be seen, ψw;f is not affected by the policy instruments. The means and the relative standard deviations under
ψ t s
t
 ¼ 0:44 are presented in the last column of Table 8. As can be seen, this specification leads to a relatively more
progressive labour income taxation and a qualitative change in the relative standard deviations for income taxes, since τu is
now about 50% more volatile than τs (recall than under endogenous relative skill supply in the benchmark model, τs is about
30% more volatile than τu). However, despite the qualitative difference, the magnitude of the volatilities remains very small,
so that labour tax smoothing maintains quantitatively in this specification. Since this specification directly restricts the
quantity of relative skill supply in the market economy, the implied wedge derived above is higher and significantly more
volatile, compared with the wedge due to externalities and policy distortions.
6. Conclusions
Motivated by the empirical relevance of the wage-skill premium and the roles played by capital-skill complementarity,
the relative supply of skilled labour and capital augmenting technical change, this paper contributed to the tax smoothing
literature by undertaking a normative investigation of the quantitative properties of optimal taxation of capital and labour
income, as well as skill-acquisition expenditure, in the presence of aggregate shocks to total factor productivity (TFP),
investment-specific technological change and government spending.
We found that labour tax smoothing maintained in this environment. In particular, labour taxes were the smoothest over
the business cycle, followed by a subsidy to skill acquisition, while capital taxes were the most volatile of all instruments.
We considered different assumptions and imperfections regarding the mechanism that generated the relative skill supply
and further found that although these mattered for the volatility of the wedge between marginal rates of substitution and
transformation in skill acquisition, the volatility of the tax instruments was not affected quantitatively.Acknowledgments
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Appendix A. Household's ﬁrst-order conditions
The household's first-order conditions for consumption, skilled labour supply, unskilled labour supply, debt, capital and
the relative skill supply are given respectively by the following relations:
ucðstÞ ¼ λt st
  ðA:1Þ
uhs ðstÞ ¼ λtðstÞψ tðstÞ 1τst ðstÞ
 
wst s
t   ðA:2Þ
uhu ðstÞ ¼ λtðstÞ 1ψ tðstÞ
 
1τut ðstÞ
 
wut s
t  ðA:3Þ
uψ ðstÞ ¼ λtðstÞfhst st
 
1τst st
  wst st hut st  1τut st  wut st gþλtðstÞ 1τat st  gψ st  ðA:4Þ
πt st
 
λtðstÞpt stþ1∣st
 ¼ βπtþ1 stþ1 λtþ1ðstþ1Þ ðA:5Þ
πt st
 
λtðstÞAkt ðstÞ ¼ β ∑
stþ 1 ∣st
fπtþ1 stþ1
 
λtþ1ðstþ1Þ  rtþ1 stþ1
 
1τktþ1 stþ1
 h iþ 1δ Aktþ1ðstþ1Þh ig: ðA:6ÞAppendix B. Efﬁcient allocations
The following Appendix follows the analysis in Arseneau and Chugh (2012), Appendix C. We first obtain the conditions
that characterise the efficient allocations for the model economy arising from the social planner's problem. We then
describe the static and dynamic efficiency conditions in terms of marginal rates of substitution (MRS) and marginal rates of
transformation (MRT), where the MRTs are derived from economic primitives, independent of optimisation.
B.1. Social planner's problem
The social planner's stochastic problem can be written as follows:
∑
1
t ¼ 0
∑
st
βtπt st
 
u ct st
 
;ψ tðstÞ;hst st
 
;hut s
t   ðB:1Þ
ctðstÞþget ðstÞþgðÞþAkt ðstÞ ktþ1ðstÞ 1δ
 
ktðst1Þ
 YðÞ ¼ 0 ðB:2Þ
where YðÞ denotes the production technology as a function of the economy's resources, i.e. YðÞ  Y hst st
 
;

hut s
t
 
;ψ tðstÞ; ktðst1Þ; st ; and gðÞ denotes skill acquisition expenditure as a function of relative skill supply, i.e.
et st
  gðÞ ¼ g ψ tðstÞ  and gψ st 40. Note that in the social planner's problem given by (B1)–(B2), the time constraints
(1)–(2) are used to substitute out lst s
t
 
and lut s
t
 
in the ln;st s
t
 
and ln;ut s
t
 
identities respectively which are arguments in
the utility function (6); and the capital evolution Eq. (4) has been substituted into the aggregate resource constraint
(B.2) for itðstÞ. The planner maximises (B.1) subject to the sequence of constraints in (B.2) by choosing
fct st
 
; hst s
t
 
; hut s
t
 
; ψ tðstÞ; ktþ1 st
 8stg1t ¼ 0, given initial values for k0. This yields the following five first-order
conditions:
uc st
 þλpt st ¼ 0 ðB:3Þ
uhs s
t λpt st Yhs st ¼ 0 ðB:4Þ
uhu s
t λpt st Yhu st ¼ 0 ðB:5Þ
uψ st
 þλpt st gψ st λpt st Yψ st ¼ 0 ðB:6Þ
πt st
 
λpt s
t Akt ðstÞβ ∑
st þ 1 ∣st
πtþ1 stþ1
 
λptþ1 s
tþ1 Aktþ1ðstþ1Þ  1δ β ∑
stþ 1 ∣st
πtþ1 stþ1
 
λptþ1 s
tþ1 Yk stþ1 ¼ 0 ðB:7Þ
where λt
p
is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the aggregate resource constraint.
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Substituting (B.3) into (B.4)–(B.6) for λt st
 
gives the model's static efficiency conditions:
uhs s
t
 
uc stð Þ
¼ Yhs st
  ðB:8Þ
uhu s
t
 
uc stð Þ
¼ Yhu st
  ðB:9Þ
uψ s
t
 
uc stð Þ
¼ Yψ st
 gψ st : ðB:10Þ
B.3. Intertemporal efficiency
Substituting (B.3) and its one-period lead for λt st
 
and λtþ1 stþ1
 
into (B.6) gives the model's intertemporal efficiency
condition:
Etf
βuc stþ1
 
uc stð ÞAkt ðstÞ
Aktþ1ðstþ1Þ 1δ
 þYk stþ1 h ig ¼ 1: ðB:11Þ
B.4. Transformation frontier
The efficiency conditions can be described in terms of appropriately defined marginal rates of substitution and
transformation. This permits us to relate efficiency to the general principle that efficient allocations are characterised by the
equality of these margins. Following Arseneau and Chugh (2012), we focus on the non-stochastic equivalent of the efficiency
conditions, because it allows for the separation of the components of preferences from those of technology. This then allows
us to re-express the efficiency conditions (B.8)–(B.11) in terms of MRSs and MRTs. The non-stochastic version of (B.8)–(B.11)
is given by
MRShst ;ct  
uhs tð Þ
uc tð Þ
¼ Yhs tð Þ ðB:12Þ
MRShut ;ct  
uhu tð Þ
uc tð Þ
¼ Yhu tð Þ ðB:13Þ
MRSψ t ;ct  
βuψ t
uct
¼ Yψ st
 gψ st  ðB:14Þ
IMRSct þ 1 ;ct 
ucðtÞ
βucðtþ1Þ
¼ A
k
tþ1 1δ
 þYkðtþ1Þ
Akt
: ðB:15Þ
The non-stochastic transformation frontier is defined as34
Υ ct ;ψ t ;h
s
t ;h
u
t ; ktþ1; 
   ctþg ðtÞ½ þAkt ktþ1 1δ kt Y ðtÞ½  ¼ 0: ðB:16Þ
The function Υ ðÞ jointly describes the two technologies in the model (i.e. goods production and skill creation) and is a
function of period t choices. By leading this function one period we obtain
Υ 0 ct ;ψ tþ1;h
s
t ;h
u
t ; ktþ1; ctþ1;ψ tþ2; ktþ2;h
s
tþ1;h
u
tþ1; 
   ctþ1þg ðtþ1Þ½ þAktþ1 ktþ2 1δ ktþ1 Y ðtþ1Þ½  ¼ 0:
ðB:17Þ
To capture the dependence between period t and tþ1 allocations directly, we can view Υ 0ðÞ as a generalisation of Υ ðÞ by
explicitly allowing for the state variables in period tþ1 to be determined by choices in period t. We denote as GðÞ the
representation where period t allocations are incorporated in the period tþ1 transformation frontier by re-arranging Υ ðÞ
for ktþ1 and substituting into Υ
0ðÞ:
G ct ;ψ tþ1;h
s
t ;h
u
t ; ktþ1; ctþ1;ψ tþ2; ktþ2;h
s
tþ1;h
u
tþ1; 
   ctþ1þg ðtþ1Þ½ þAktþ1 ktþ2 1δ ktþ1 ð Þ 
Y ðtþ1Þ½  ¼ 0 ðB:18Þ34 As in Arseneau and Chugh (2012) and without loss of generality, in what follows, get ¼ 0 for all t.
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ktþ1 ð Þ ¼
1
Akt
Y ðtÞ½ þ 1δ kt 1
Akt
g ðtÞ½  1
Akt
ct : ðB:19Þ
B.5. Static rates of transformation
Differentiating Υ ðÞ with respect to each of its contemporaneous arguments and substituting Υ ct into the remaining
condition gives35
MRThs ;ct  
Υ hst
Υ ct
¼ Yhs tð Þ ðB:20Þ
MRThu ;ct  
Υ hut
Υ ct
¼ Yhu tð Þ ðB:21Þ
MRTψ t ;ct  
Υψ t
Υ ct
¼ Yψ tð Þgψ tð Þ: ðB:22Þ
Therefore, the conditions for atemporal efficiency (B.12)–(B.14) can be expressed in terms of equalisation of MRSs to MRTs.
B.6. Dynamic rates of transformation
To calculate the IMRTct þ 1 ;ct first note that from (B.19) and Υ ðÞ
∂ktþ1
∂ct
¼  1
Akt
¼  Υ ct
Υ kt þ 1
: ðB:23Þ
Differentiating GðÞ with respect to ctþ1 and ct respectively gives36
Gct þ 1 ¼ 1 ðB:24Þ
Gct ¼ Aktþ1 1δ
 ∂ktþ1
∂ct
Yk tþ1ð Þ
∂ktþ1
∂ct
¼ A
k
tþ1 1δ
 þYkðtþ1Þ
Akt
ðB:25Þ
implying
IMRTct þ 1 ;ct 
Gct
Gct þ 1
¼ A
k
tþ1 1δ
 þYkðtþ1Þ
Akt
: ðB:26Þ
Thus we can see that (B.15) implies
IMRSct þ 1 ;ct 
ucðtÞ
βucðtþ1Þ
¼ A
k
tþ1 1δ
 þYkðtþ1Þ
Akt
 IMRTct þ 1 ;ct : ðB:27Þ
Therefore, the condition for intertemporal efficiency (B.11) can be expressed in terms of MRS and MRT as
Et
βuc stþ1
 
uc stð Þ
Aktþ1ðstþ1Þ 1δ
 þYk stþ1 h i
Akt ðstÞ
8<
:
9=
;¼ 1 ) Et IMRTct þ 1 ;ctIMRSct þ 1 ;ct

 
¼ 1: ðB:28Þ
Appendix C. Wedges
This appendix derives the wedges that prevent the first-order conditions in the market economy from satisfying the
efficiency conditions obtained in Appendix B. As will be shown, they are due to the presence of distorting taxation as well as
the externality in skill creation. To relate the two sets of conditions, note that since we assume the same production
technology between the social planner and market economy, we have that
Yðhst st
 
;hut s
t ;ψ tðstÞ; ktðst1Þ; stÞ  Fðhs;ft hst st ;ψ tðstÞ ;hu;ft hut st ;ψ tðstÞ ; kft ktðst1Þ ; stÞ ðC:1Þ35 Note that since Υ ðÞ is a function of variables dated both t and tþ1, we explicitly denote the arguments over which the differentiation of Υ ðÞ is
carried out.
36 Note that since GðÞ is a function of variables dated t, tþ1 and tþ2, we explicitly denote the arguments over which the differentiation of GðÞ is
undertaken.
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Fhu;f ðstÞ and Fk;f ðstÞ to Yhs st
 
, Yhu s
t
 
, Yψ st
 
and Yk st
 
as follows:
Yhs s
t  ∂FðÞ
∂hsðstÞ ¼ Fhs;f s
t ∂hs;ft st 
∂hsðstÞ ¼ Fhs;f s
t ψ t st  ðC:2Þ
Yhu s
t  ∂FðÞ
∂huðstÞ ¼ Fhu;f s
t ∂hu;ft st 
∂huðstÞ ¼ Fhu;f s
t  1ψ tðstÞ  ðC:3Þ
Yψ st
  ∂FðÞ
∂ψ ðstÞ ¼ Fhs;f s
t ∂hs;ft st 
∂ψ ðstÞ þFhu;f s
t ∂hu;ft st 
∂ψ ðstÞ
¼ Fhs;f ðstÞh
s
t s
t Fhu;f ðstÞhut st  ðC:4Þ
Yk s
t  ∂FðÞ
∂kðst1Þ ¼ Fk;f s
t  ∂kft st 
∂kðst1Þ ¼ Fk;f s
t : ðC:5Þ
C.1. Static wedges
In the decentralised equilibrium with policy distortions, the conditions characterising static trade-offs are given by
Eqs. (7), (8) and (23), where the wage rates are given by Eqs. (24) and (25), implying that the static conditions are
uhs ðs
tÞ
ucðstÞ
¼ψ t st
 
Fhs;f s
t  1τst ðstÞ  ðC:6Þ
uhu ðs
tÞ
ucðstÞ
¼ 1ψ tðstÞ
 
Fhu;f s
t  1τut ðstÞ  ðC:7Þ
uψ ðs
tÞ
ucðstÞ
¼ hst st
 
1τst st
  
Fhs;f s
t hut st  1τut st  Fhu;f st  1τat st   ~gψ st : ðC:8Þ
Substituting (C.2)–(C.3) into (C.6)–(C.7), we have
uhs ðs
tÞ
ucðstÞ
¼ Yhs st
 
1τst ðstÞ
  ðC:9Þ
uhu ðs
tÞ
ucðstÞ
¼ Yhu st
 
1τut ðstÞ
 
: ðC:10Þ
Comparing (C.9)–(C.10) with (B.8)–(B.9) we can see that the skilled and unskilled labour wedges are given by the skilled and
unskilled labour taxes respectively. Moreover, note that (C.8) can be re-arranged as
uψ ðs
tÞ
ucðstÞ
¼ Fhs;f st
 
hst s
t Fhu;f st hut st gψ st þgψ st Fhs;f st hst st þFhu;f st hut st 
 ~gψ st
 þhst st  1τst st  Fhs;f ðstÞhut st  1τut st  Fhu;f ðstÞþτat st  ~gψ st  ðC:11Þ
which implies using (C.4) that
uψ ðs
tÞ
ucðstÞ
¼ Yψ st
 gψ st þgψ st  ~gψ st þτat st  ~gψ st τst st Fhs;f st hst st þτut st Fhu;f st hut st 
where we can define the wedge in relative skill supply as the difference between the efficient and market margins of
adjustment to be
ψw ¼ ~gψ st
 gψ st τat st  ~gψ st þτst st Fhs;f ðstÞhst st τut st Fhu;f ðstÞhut st : ðC:12Þ
In this case, setting the tax rates to zero will not eliminate the wedge if there are externalities, since ~gψ st
 
agψ s
t
 
.
C.2. Dynamic wedge
In the decentralised equilibrium with policy distortions, the condition characterising dynamic trade-offs is given by (11),
where the interest rate is given by (26), implying that the dynamic condition for capital is
Et
βucðstþ1Þ
ucðstÞAkt ðstÞ
Aktþ1ðstþ1Þð1δÞ þ 1τktþ1ðstþ1Þ
 	
Fk;f s
tþ1 h i( )¼ 1: ðC:13Þ
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tþ1  into (C.13), using (C.5) yielding
Etf βucðs
tþ1Þ
ucðstÞAkt ðstÞ
Aktþ1 stþ1ð Þ 1δ
 þ 1τktþ1ðstþ1Þ 	Yk stþ1 h ig ¼ 1: ðC:14Þ
Comparing (C.14) with (B.11) we can see that the asset market wedge is equal to the capital tax rate.
Appendix D. Deterministic Ramsey system
In a non-stochastic environment, the first-order conditions derived in (42)–(50) of the main text become for t¼0:
Vhs 0ð Þ ¼  Vc 0ð ÞΦAc½ Yhs 0ð ÞþΦAhs ðD:1Þ
Vhu 0ð Þ ¼  Vc 0ð ÞΦAc½ Yhu 0ð ÞþΦAhu ðD:2Þ
Vψ 0ð Þ ¼ Vc 0ð ÞΦAc½  gψ 0ð ÞYψ 0ð Þ
h i
þΦAψ ðD:3Þ
Vc 0ð ÞAk0 ¼ βVc 1ð Þ Yk 1ð Þþ 1δ
 
Ak1
h i
þΦAc ðD:4Þ
Y  0ð Þ½  ¼ c0þge0þg ð0Þð Þþ k1ð1δÞk0
 
Ak0 ðD:5Þ for t ¼ 1;2;3…T1:
Vhs tð Þ ¼ Vc tð ÞYhs tð Þ ðD:6Þ
Vhu tð Þ ¼ Vc tð ÞYhu tð Þ ðD:7Þ
Vψ tð Þ ¼ Vc tð Þ gψ tð ÞYψ tð Þ
h i
ðD:8Þ
Vc tð ÞAkt ¼ βVc tþ1ð Þ Yk tþ1ð Þþ 1δ
 
Aktþ1
h i
ðD:9Þ
Y  tð Þ½  ¼ ctþget þg ðtÞð Þþ ktþ1ð1δÞkt
 
Akt ðD:10Þ for t ¼ T :
Vhs Tð Þ ¼ Vc Tð ÞYhs Tð Þ ðD:11Þ
Vhu Tð Þ ¼ Vc Tð ÞYhu Tð Þ ðD:12Þ
Vψ Tð Þ ¼ Vc Tð Þ gψ Tð ÞYψ Tð Þ
h i
ðD:13Þ
AkT ¼ β Yk Tð Þþ 1δ
 
AkT
h i
ðD:14Þ
Y  Tð Þ½  ¼ cTþgeTþg  Tð Þð ÞδkTAkT ðD:15Þ lifetime implementability constraint:
∑
T
t ¼ 0
βt ½uc tð Þctþuhs tð Þhstþuhu tð Þhut þuc tð ÞΩ tð Þ  g  tð Þ½ A¼ 0 ðD:16Þwhere A¼ uc 0ð Þ b0þ ð1τk0ÞYk 0ð Þþ 1δ
 
Ak0
h i
k0
n o
and Ω tð Þ ¼ fðuhs ðtÞ=ucðtÞψ tÞhstþðuhu ðtÞ=ucðtÞð1ψ tÞÞhut þ uψ ðtÞ=ucðtÞg= ~gψ
tð Þ; the Lagrange multiplier θt has been replaced with VcðtÞ using (42) and the notation XðtÞ denotes the time period t
quantity of X.
Appendix E. ex ante capital tax
First, assume that the government uses a capital tax that is not state-contingent, so that its value for period tþ1 is
decided using the history st. Second, define this uncontingent tax as τk;atþ1ðstÞ and note that it needs to satisfy the Euler-
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ucðstÞAkt ðstÞ ¼ βEt ucðstþ1Þ ~F kðstþ1Þ 1τktþ1ðstþ1Þ
h i
þð1δÞAktþ1ðstþ1Þ
h in o
ðE:1Þ
where we have used ~F kðstþ1Þ ¼ rtþ1ðstþ1Þ. Hence, τk;atþ1ðstÞ needs to satisfy:
ucðstÞAkt ðstÞ ¼ βEt ucðstþ1Þ ~F kðstþ1Þ 1τk;atþ1ðstÞ
h i
þð1δÞAktþ1ðstþ1Þ
h in o
: ðE:2Þ
By comparing (E.2) with (E.1), we see that τk;atþ1ðstÞ needs to satisfy:
Et ucðstþ1Þ ~F kðstþ1Þ 1τk;atþ1ðstÞ
h i
þ 1δ Aktþ1ðstþ1Þh in o¼ Et ucðstþ1Þ ~F kðstþ1Þ 1τktþ1ðstþ1Þh iþ 1δ Aktþ1ðstþ1Þh in o
ðE:3Þ
implying that
τk;atþ1 s
t ¼ Etucðstþ1Þ τktþ1ðstþ1Þ ~F kðstþ1Þ
h i
Etucðstþ1Þ ~F kðstþ1Þ
: ðE:4Þ
This gives τk;atþ1ðstÞ the ex ante capital tax interpretation, since, by multiplying both numerator and denominator in (E.4) by
ktþ1ðstÞ, this expression provides the expected tax revenue from capital income as share of the expected capital income,
where the expectation is calculated using information at period t.
To obtain the ex ante rate stated in Eq. (51) of the main text, we first expand the Euler-equation (E.1):
ucðstÞAkt ðstÞ ¼ βEtucðstþ1Þ ~F kðstþ1ÞβEtucðstþ1Þτktþ1ðstþ1Þ ~F kðstþ1ÞþβEtucðstþ1Þ 1δ
 
Aktþ1ðstþ1Þ ðE:5Þ
and note that Etucðstþ1Þτktþ1ðstþ1Þ ~F kðstþ1Þ in (E.5) equals τk;atþ1ðstÞEtucðstþ1Þ  ~F kðstþ1Þ, using (E.4). Substituting this
expression back into (E.5) we obtain
ucðstÞAkt ðstÞ ¼ βEtucðstþ1Þ ~F kðstþ1Þβτk;atþ1ðstÞEtucðstþ1Þ ~F kðstþ1ÞþβEtucðstþ1Þ 1δ
 
Aktþ1ðstþ1Þ: ðE:6Þ
Finally solving (E.6) for τk;atþ1ðstÞ gives the ex ante capital tax rate reported in Eq. (51) of the main text.
Appendix F. Uncontingent debt
F.1. Ex-post capital tax
The treatment of state-uncontingent debt and presentation follows Chari et al. (1994) and Ljungvist and Sargent (2012,
ch. 16). Assume that the government issues uncontingent debt, btþ1 st
 
which has a risk-free return Rt st
 
. The budget
constraint of the government in period t is written as
get stð Þ ¼ τst st
 
wst s
t ψ t st hst st þτut st wut st  1ψ t st  
 hut st
 τat st g ðtÞð Þþτkt st rt st kt st1 þbtþ1 st
 
Rt stð Þ
bt st1
  ðF:1Þ
The budget constraint of the household in period t is given by
ct st
 þktþ1 st Akt stð Þþbtþ1 st
 
Rt stð Þ
þ 1τat st
  
g ðtÞð Þ ¼ 1τst st
  
wst s
t ψ t st hst st þ 1τut st  wut st 
 1ψ t st
  
hut s
t þ 1δ kt st1 Akt ðstÞþ 1τkt st h i rt st kt st1 þbt st1  ðF:2Þ
which implies that the first-order condition with respect to holding bonds is
1
Rt stð Þ
¼ βEt
ucðstþ1Þ
ucðstÞ
ðF:3Þ
In turn, this implies that the risk-free (or uncontingent) return needs to satisfy
1
Rt stð Þ
¼ ∑
st þ 1js^t
pt stþ1∣s
t : ðF:4Þ
To obtain an expression for brþ1 srð Þ for a given period r, we work as follows. We multiply the budget constraint of the
household in (F.2) for periods r and rþ1 by πr srð Þ and πrþ1 srþ1
 
respectively, sum the resulting budget constraint in rþ1
over all possible realisations srþ1 and add it to the budget constraint in period r. We then use the first-order conditions of
the household to simplify the expression and continue this forward iterative process until time period T-1. By imposing
the appropriate transversality conditions we obtain an expression for brþ1 srð Þ as a function of identified equilibrium paths
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brþ1 sr
 ¼ Rr sr  ∑
t ¼ rþ1
1
∑
st
fβt rπt st
 ½ucðstÞct st þuhs ðstÞhst st þuhu ðstÞhut st þucðstÞΩ st 
g ðtÞð Þg= πr sr
 
ucðsrÞ
 Rr sr krþ1 sr : ðF:5Þ
Hence we can use (F.3) to obtain Rt st
 
, (F.5) to find btþ1 st
 
and finally (F.1) to calculate the ex-post capital tax reported in
Eq. (52) of the main text.
F.2. Private assets tax
Assume that the government issues uncontingent debt, btþ1 st
 
, which has a risk-free return Rt st
 
, satisfying (F.4), but
which is taxed using a state-contingent tax υtþ1 stþ1
 
. The budget constraint of the government is now written as
get stð Þ ¼ τst st
 
wst s
t ψ t st hst st þτut st wut st  1ψ t st  hut st τat st g  tð Þð Þþτkt st 
rt st
 
kt st1
 þbtþ1 st
 
Rt stð Þ
 1υt st
  
bt st1
  ðF:6Þ
while the budget constraint of the household becomes
ct st
 þktþ1 st Akt stð Þþbtþ1 st
 
Rt stð Þ
þ 1τat st
  
g ðtÞð Þ ¼ 1τst st
  
wst s
t ψ t st hst st þ 1τut st  wut st 
 1ψ t st
  
hut s
t þ 1δ kt st1 Akt ðstÞþ 1τkt st h i rt st kt st1 þ 1υt st  bt st1  ðF:7Þ
which implies that the first-order condition with respect to holding bonds is
1
Rt stð Þ
¼ ∑
st þ 1 js^t
βπtþ1 st þ 1 js^t
 	ucðstþ1Þ
ucðstÞ
1υtþ1 stþ1
  
: ðF:8Þ
This implies that the asset tax must satisfy
Etucðstþ1Þυtþ1 stþ1
 ¼ 0 ðF:9Þ
which implies that at time period t, the expected value of the asset tax in period tþ1, valued in terms of utility, has to be
equal to zero. Therefore, (F.9) implies that Rt st
 
in this case is given by (F.3) as well. Moreover, to obtain (F.5), we substitute
the household budget constraints in (F.7) forward, using the household first-order conditions, the transversality conditions,
the restriction in (F.9) and the restriction that the asset tax in the initial period under consideration is zero. Note that this
restriction is equivalent to making the zero capital tax assumption in the initial period.
The private assets tax is defined as the tax revenue from assets over income from assets. In particular:
ξt s
tþ1jst ¼ τktþ1ðstþ1Þ ~F kðstþ1Þktþ1ðstÞþυtþ1 stþ1
 
btþ1 st
 
~F kðstþ1Þktþ1ðstÞþbtþ1 stð Þ
: ðF:10Þ
Solving (F.6) for υt st
 
bt st1
 
and substituting this into (F.10) we have the expression for ξt stþ1jst
 
reported in Eq. (53) of
the main text.
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